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CASE COMMENTS
Semachko v, Hopko:
Ohio's Marketable Title Act Comes to the Fore
THE OHIO MARKETABLE TITLE ACT1 became effective on September
29, 1961. 2 The purpose of the Act is to simplify and facilitate
land title transactions. 3 This is accomplished by allowing the title
examiner to search the record for title defects for only a specified
period of years back in time; all claims prior to that period are ex-
tinguished. The period of time in Ohio is forty years.4 Therefore, if
a person has a record chain of title for forty years, then any conflict-
ing claims based upon any title transactions prior to that forty year
period are extinguished. 5 The basic concept is simple, but there are
many technicalities in the Ohio Marketable Title Act. For this reason,
the Act is little known, little used, and even less understood. This
is amply demonstrated by the fact that on August 23, 1973, twelve
years after the Act's passage, the Eighth District Court of Appeals
was the first Ohio court to apply the Act, in Semachko v. Hopko.6
The purpose of this comment is threefold:
1. To show the reasons for the need of such an act in Ohio and
its development from the Model Act.7
2. To show an application of the Act as exemplified by Semachko.
3. To point out further problems and technicalities outside the
scope of Semachko.
1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§5301.47-.56 (Page 1970), as amended (§§5301.53 & 5301.56)
(Page, Current Material 1974).
2 Semachko v. Hopko, 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 209, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563 (8th Dist. 1973).
3Id. at 209, 301 N.E.2d at 563.
4OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §5301.47(E) (Page 1970).
5 This is the general concept for the method of applying the Ohio Marketable Title Act, but,
as will be seen in the ensuing discussion, this is something of an understatement because of
the many exceptions and intricacies of the Act.
6 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 301 N.E.2d 560 (8th Dist. 1973).
7 The Ohio Marketable Title Act is identical to the Model Act except for the additions in the
Ohio Act of the following provisions in italics:
§5301.49 Limitations on record marketable title.
Such record marketable title shall be subject to:
(A) All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments of which
such chain of record title is formed; ... provided that possibilities of reverter, and
rights of entry or powers of termination for breach of condition subsequent, which
interests are inherent in the muniments of which such chain of record title is
formed and which have existed for forty years or more, shall be preserved and kept
effective only in the manner provided in section 5301.51 of the Revised Code;
§5301.53 Exceptions.
The provisions of sections 5301.47 to 5301.56, inclusive, of the Revised Code,
shall not be applied:
(Continued on next page)
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Background
The Ohio Marketable Title Act became effective September 29,
1961, making Ohio the tenth marketable title act jurisdiction e and
one of the jurisdictions which patterned its act on the Model Mar-
ketable Title Act 9 prepared by Simes and Taylor for the Real Prop-
erty, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion and the University of Michigan Law School. 10 This committee
was formed to find a solution to the problems of long title searches
to determine marketability of any given title. 1 The problems en-
countered by the length of some title searches are amply displayed
by this illustrative, if not amusing, anecdote:
A New Orleans lawyer sought a Reconstruction Finance
Corporation loan for a client. He was told that the loan would
be granted if he could prove satisfactory title to property
offered as collateral. The title dated back to 1803, and he had
to spend three months running it down. After sending the
information to the RFC he received this reply:
(Continued from preceding page)
(A) To bar any lessor or his successor as reversioner of his right to possession on
the expiration of any lease or any lessee or his successor of his rights in and to
any lease;
(B) To bar or extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement
created or held for any railroad or public utility purpose;
(C) ...
(D) To bar or extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an ease-
ment, or any rights granted, excepted, or reserved by the instrument creating such
easement or interest, including all rights for future use, if the existence of such
easement or interest is evidenced by the location beneath, upon, or above any part
of the land described in such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, con-
duit, duct, sewer, track, pole, tower, or other physical facility and whether or not
such facility is observable;
(E) To bar or extinguish any mortgage recorded in conformity with section
1701.66 of the Revised Code;
(F) To bar or extinguish any right, tide, or interest of the United States, or of
the state of Ohio, or any political subdivision, body politic, or agency thereof.
The Model Act also differs from the Ohio Act in that the Ohio Act gives a three year
grace period for recording claims which have been extinguished by the passage of forty years
after the effective date of the root of tide. This three year period ended September 29, 1964,
and was repealed on December 17, 1973; except for mineral rights, which time was ex-
tended until December 31, 1976, because of the deletion of mineral rights from the excep-
tions under §5301.53, effective December 31, 1973. The Model Act allowed only a two
year grace period.
8 P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES 431 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as BASYE].
91d.; 0. BROWDER JR., R. CUNNINGHAM, & J. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 975 (2d ed.
1973), points out that fifteen states now have such legislation. They are: Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
bId. Those states whose Acts are patterned after the Model Act are: Connecticut, Florida,




OHIO'S MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
"We received your letter today enclosing application for
loan for your client, supported by abstract of title. Let us
compliment you on the able manner in which you prepared
and presented the application. However, you have not cleared
the title before the year 1803, and therefore, before final
approval can be accorded the application, it will be necessary
that the title be cleared back of that year."
Annoyed, the lawyer replied:
"Your letter regarding titles in Case No. 189156 re-
ceived. I note that you wish titles extended further back
than I have presented them. I was unaware that any edu-
cated man in the world failed to know that Louisiana was
purchased from France in 1803. The title to the land was
acquired by France by right of conquest from Spain. The
land came into possession of Spain by right of discovery
made in 1492 by a sailor named Christopher Columbus, who
had been granted the privilege of seeking a new route to
India by the then reigning monarch, Isabella. The good
queen, being a pious woman, and [as] careful about titles,
almost, I might say, as the RFC, took the precaution of secur-
ing the blessings of the Pope upon the voyage before she sold
her jewels to help Columbus. Now the Pope, as you know, is
the emissary of Jesus Christ, The Son of God, who, it is com-
monly accepted, made the world. Therefore, I believe it is
safe to presume that he also made that part of the United
States called Louisiana, and I hope to hell you are satisfied. ' 12
When the committee finished the Model Act13 it was in reality
three distinct acts which, when combined, fulfilled the purpose of
shortening the length of search time to a period of only forty years.
First, the Model is similar to a statute of limitations in that the
filing of a notice is required to preserve a right of action founded
upon any transaction which occurred prior to the forty year period.14
It is more than a statute of limitations, however, because it runs even
against persons under disabilities. 5
Second, the Model Act has attributes of a curative act by operat-
ing to correct certain defects which have arisen in the execution of
12 Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 49 (1958). For other examples of
problems prior to the Marketable Title Acts, induding specific mention of Ohio cases, see
Aigler, Title Problems in Land Transfers, 24 MIcH. ST. B. J. 202, 205-13 (1945).
13 The Model Act was completed in 1960. L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS 111 (1966).
14 C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 260 (2d ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as SMITH & BOYER].
"sBoyer & Shapo, Florida's Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 103, (1963).
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instruments in the chain of title.16 Yet, it goes beyond general cura-
tive statutes because it actually invalidates interests instead of merely
curing formal defects."
Third, the Model Act can be compared to a recording act be-
cause it requires that notice be given to the public of the existence
of conditions and restrictions arising from ancient records,T6 but
again surpasses the recording acts in requiring re-recording of out-
standing interests in order to preserve them."
Therefore, by using and adding to the basic concepts of the
recording acts, the curative acts, and statutes of limitation, the Model
Act enables the title examiner to employ the following simplified pro-
cedure. At the time marketability is to be determined, the title ex-
aminer must search back forty years, and find the first title transfer
before this forty year period. This is the root of title for the property
in question.20 This transfer, and all subsequent transfers, are basically
all that the title examiner must concern himself with in regard to his
title search. The only three methods by which a claim prior to the root
may still be in existence are by: 1. a recording under the Notice
Index ;21 2. a specific mention of an older transaction in one of the
muniments of title2 in the forty year period ;23 or 3. a right arising
from adverse possession, which possession was in whole or in part
subsequent to the effective date of the root of title.2 4 The first two will
be discussed in detail.
Besides shortening the time needed by the title examiner to
search the record for defects, the Model Act has an ancillary at-
tribute. It extinguishes ancient records and interests which "fetter
the marketability of real estate,"25 barring these lesser interests
which conflict with the fee on the rationale that these interests are
insignificant compared to the value gained by freeing the land through
a shorter title search. Such is the case in Semachko v. Hopko.
26
16 SMITH & BOYER, supra note 14, at 260.
17 Boyer & Shapo, supra note 15, at 104.
Is SMITH & BOYER, supra note 14, at 260.
19 Boyer & Shapo, supra note 15, at 104.
20 Model Act §8 (e), see BASYE, supra note 8, at 381.
21 Model Act §5; see BASYE, supra note 8, at 379-80.
22 
"Muniments of title" are those instruments of writing and written evidence which the owner
of lands . . . has, and by which he is enabled to defend the title of his estate. 3 R. HAUSSER
& W. VAN AKEN, OHIO PRACTICE §141 (1964).
2 Model Act §2(a); see BASYE, supra note 8, at 378.
2 Smith, The New Marketable Title Act, 22 OHIO ST. L. J. 712, 718 (1961).
2 5 Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 100, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812 (1957).
26 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 301 N..2d 560 (8th Dist. 1973).
(Vol. 23:337
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Semachko v. Hopko
Facts
Hopko purchased property in a subdivision in which Semachko had
a residential dwelling. Hopko purchased the property in order to
erect a commercial dwelling, a mortuary, and the council of the City
of Parma rezoned Hopko's property to achieve this purpose.
Semachko then brought an action for declaratory judgment,
injunction, and other relief, alleging that all the lots in the sub-
division had the same deed restriction that ran with the land, to wit:
. . . That no building shall be erected or suffered to be
erected on said lot nearer than 35 feet to the sidewalk line
and to cost at least $1,200. Said building to be used for pri-
vate residence purposes only.27 [emphasis added]
Hopko's answer denied the restriction on the use of their prop-
erty based on the Ohio Marketable Title Act, §§5301.47 through
5301.56, inclusive, of the Ohio Revised Code.
The following is illustrative of the






record of transfers for the
S. H. Kleinman - 46
lots, with restrictions
on all lots when he
transferred them.
to Sara Dooley - Sub-
lot 2 use restriction




Sublot 2 use restric-
tion ".... to be used
for residence purposes
only."
to William Sargis, small
portion of Sublot 2.
No restrictions in
deed.
to Joe and Anna
Klamar, large portion
of Sublot 2, no restric-
tion in deed.
RId. at 212, 301 N.E.2d at 564-65.
19743
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Period 1959-1960 to Joe and Anna
Klamar, small portion
of Sublot 2, no restric-
tion in deed.
May 1, 1967 to Walter G. Gazda
and Adlyn G. Gazda,
all of original Sublot 2.
December 4, 1970 to Charles, Dorothy




December 14, 1970 Plaintiffs filed com-
plaint.
July 10, 1972 Trial.
The trial court granted a temporary restraining order, and the
case proceeded to trial. Judgment was for the defendant purchasers,
the Hopkos.
The decision in the lower court was not based on the Ohio
Marketable Title Act. Instead, the traditional test of "substantial
change in conditions" was used, the trial court finding:
. . . that the nature of Broadview Road has changed sub-
stantially in recent years and the changes have been so
drastic that the intent of the deed restriction to preserve the
residential nature of the locality has been nullified. The dis-
trict is business and not residential in nature.2
On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals considered two
principal issues:
1. Whether the restriction in the use of the subject
property for private residence purposes only is valid or was
extinguished under the Ohio Marketable Title Act. §§ 5301.47
through 5301.56, Ohio Revised Code; and
2. Whether there have been substantial and drastic
changes in the neighborhood which would nullify the deed
restrictions. 2
Semachko and the Act
The court of appeals in Semachko, recognizing the technical
nature of the Ohio Marketable Title Act,3 0 [hereinafter referred to
3 Id. at 208, 301 N.E.2d at 562.
2 Id. at 209, 301 N.E.2d at 562-63.
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§5301.47-.56 (Page 1970), as admeded (§§5301.53 & 5301.56)
(Page, Current Material 1974).
(Vol. 23:337
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as the Act], began its review of the Act by defining those who may
invoke it to obtain a marketable record title:
Any person having legal capacity to own land in this
State, who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any
interest in land for forty years or more, has a marketable
record title to such interest. A person has such an unbroken
chain of title when the official public records disclose a con-
veyance or other title transaction of record of not less than
forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined.
The conveyance or other title transaction must purport to
create such interest, either in the person claiming it or in
some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances
or other title transactions of record, such purported inter-
est has become vested. However, nothing must appear of
record purporting to divest such claimant of such purported
interest.3
In effect, the Act says that if A has had title to Blackacre for a
period in excess of forty years, with no other conveyances taking
place within the forty year period, then A has whatever marketable
record title was given to him by that prior conveyance. If the inter-
est was a fee simple absolute, then A has a marketable record title
to the land in fee simple absolute. If it was a lesser fee, then this is
all that A has, for A cannot claim more from the title he is using to
determine his marketability than the title grants.32
Also, A can claim marketable title through those prior title
holders during the forty year period prior to the date on which
marketability is being determined. For example, if A purchased from
B in 1970, and B purchased from C in 1930, and A's marketability is
being determined as of 1973, then A can claim through B and C, and
whatever title C had in 1930 will be used to determine A's market-
ability. Thus, the prescribed period of forty years is not an absolute
limit, but must be combined with whatever additional period is
needed until a conveyance is encountered which purports to vest the
interest under investigation. 33
However, in neither of the situations above may anything appear
of record purporting to divest the claimant, who is attempting to
determine marketability, from his purported interest. 4 Therefore, in
31 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 209, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563 (8th Dist. 1973).
32 2 T. MCDERMOTT, OHIO REAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE §1-44A (Supp. 1972). But
cf. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). The Minnesota Act is
quite different from the Ohio and the Model acts.
33 BASYE, supra note 8, at 375.
3 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 209, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563 (8th Dist. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§5301.48 (Page 1970).
1974]
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the last example, if A's transferred interest from B contained a specific
use restriction, then this use restriction is a part of A's title not-
withstanding the fact that no such restriction was contained in C's
title. The restriction from B to A affects A's fee simple absolute inter-
est contained in the root of title of C, but only by the inclusion of the
use restriction in A's interest.
It must be noted that the Act does not undertake to formulate
a precise definition of marketability,35 but by eliminating those mat-
ters of record created prior to the effective root of title, the Act in
effect defines marketable title as the root of title and the period there-
after to the present.
As the court in Semachko declares:
"Marketable record title" means a title of record, which
operates to extinguish such interests and claims existing
prior to the effective date of the root of title. R.C. 5301.47
(A). Subject to certain exceptions stated in R.C. 5301.49,
record marketable title shall be held by its owner and shall
be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear
of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the existence
of which depends on any act, transaction, event or omission
that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title.
R.C. 5301.50.36
Thus, rather than actually defining marketability, the Act limits
and prescribes the time from which that determination is to be made,
37
and anything outside the scope of that time is extinguished, subject
to certain exceptions. 38 However, that the Act defines the period of
time from which the marketability of the title is to be determined is
not to say that the title is marketable in the popular or commercial
sense,39 because the property may be in a slow-moving area or even
swamp land. Rather, it is marketable in the technical sense that it
will point out any encumbering defects which might inhibit any
transfer, or declares that no such defects exist.
In regard to defects not of record: if they occurred prior to the
effective date of the root of title, they are no longer viable. 40 But if
they occurred after the root, then they may still affect the interest
3s BASYE, supra note 8, at 371.
3 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 209-10, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563 (8th Dist. 1973).
37 BASYE, supra note 8, at 371.
3 The exceptions are in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.53 (Page 1970), as amended (Page
Current Material 1974), and are discussed infra at The Act Outside Semachko.
39 L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 11 (1960).
40 BASYE, supra note 8, at 373.
[Vol. 23:337
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in question. For this reason policies of title insurance will still be an
important, and often a necessary, part of a title transfer transaction.
Applying these concepts to the facts in Semachko, the court de-
termined that the Hopkos had two separate roots of title to the land
because of the split in 1932 of Original Sublot 2.41 The court said the
Act, which was to be liberally construed, defined "root of title" as:
• . . that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain
of title of a person purporting to create the interest claimed
by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the mar-
ketability of his title, and which was the most recent to
be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time
when marketability is being determined. The effective date
of the root of title is the date on which it is recorded. R.C.
5301.47 (E) .42
Marketability was being determined by the court as of July 10,
1972, the time of the trial.43 The first step in applying the Act was
to go back forty years (July 10, 1932), and then to find the first
recorded title transaction prior to July 10, 1932. In this case, it
was the March 4, 1932 transfer from Emma Sargis to William Sargis
for the smaller portion of Sublot 2. This, then, is the root of title for
the smaller portion of Sublot 2." There were no restrictions in this
deed.
The next step in determining marketability for the smaller por-
tion of Sublot 2 was to take the root of title, and any defects and
interests which are inherent in the muniments of the recorded title,
and see if there were any restrictions. Since the only mention of any
restrictions in the muniments was in the December 4, 1970 transfer
to Charles, Dorothy, and Cheryll Hopko, and since this was only a
general reference to "restrictions of record," then there were no
restrictions on this smaller portion of Sublot 2. 4 5 The Act is quite
clear that indefinite references will not suffice to keep alive a restric-
tion on property.46 The reference, to maintain such restriction, must
be specific and must spell out in clear language what the restriction
is and from where it came.
41 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 215, 301 N.E.2d 560, 566 (8th Dist. 1973).
42Id. at 210, 301 N.E.2d at 563.
43 Id. at 214, 301 N.E.2d at 565.
4Id. at 215, 301 N.E.2d at 566.
45/Id
46Id. at 210, 301 N.E.2d at 563. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §5301A9(A) (Page 1970) states
that:
a general reference in such muniments, or any of them, to easements, use
restrictions, or other interests created prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient
to preserve them, unless specific identification be made therein of a recorded title
transaction which creates such easement, use restriction, or other interest . ...
1974)
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The recording notice, which would have kept this use restriction
functional, would have had to be filed prior to March 4, 1972, and
this was not done.47 Again, the Act is quite clear on this point, and
as the court summarizes this section of the Act:
Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and
keep effective such interest by filing for record a notice of
such interest in writing with the county recorder during
the forty year period immediately following the effective date
of the root of title of the person whose record title would
otherwise be marketable. . . ..
Thus, the use restriction on the smaller portion of Sublot 2 was
extinguished by the Act.4 9
But the result was different with the larger portion of Sublot 2.
Again applying the Act, the first step was to go back in time forty
years before the time marketability was being determined, and then
search for the first title transfer prior to that date (July 10, 1932).
This was the transfer from Sarah Dooley to Emma Sargis on May
26, 1922, and is the root of title for the larger portion of Sublot 2.
Since the use restriction, ". . . to be used for residence purposes
only," is specifically mentioned in this deed, then the use restriction
on the larger portion is still binding.50 This is true even though the
restriction is more than forty years old and has not been protected
through a recording notice in the Notice Index. The restriction is in
the root of title itself, which is, of course, one of the muniments of
the title for the larger portion of Sublot 2, and the Act does not
extinguish "interests and defects which are inherent in the muni-
ments of the chain of record title."51 Therefore, the use restriction is
still binding on the larger portion of Sublot 2.
The court then stated that the same rules apply in preserving a
subdivision use restriction on the whole subdivision.5 2 The three meth-
ods by which that result could be accomplished accrue if the use
restriction was either:
47 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.51 (Page 1970). For a worthwhile comment on the record-
ing provision see L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 111-12 (2d
ed. 1966).
4 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 210, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563 (8th Dist. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§5301.51 (A) (Page 1970).
49 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 215, 301 N.E.2d 560, 566 (8th Dist. 1973).
50 d. at 215-16, 301 N.E.2d at 566; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.49(A) (Page 1970). See
supra note 46.
5 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 210, 301 N.E.2d 560, 563-64 (8th Dist. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §5301.49(A) (Page 1970). This section of the Ohio Act is included in the majority
of the Marketable Title Acts, but when it is not included the result is contra. See, e.g.,
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957), wherein a use restriction
was deemed extinguished by the passage of the forty year period antedating the root of
title. This result was true even though the use restriction was in the root itself.
52 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 211-12, 301 N.E.2d 560, 564 (8th Dist. 1973).
[Vol. 23:337
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1. specifically stated or identified in the root of title of
every parcel in the subdivision;
2. specifically stated or identified in the muniments of
record chain of title of every parcel in the subdivision; [or]
3. recorded pursuant to . . . [preserving notice re-
quirements] . . . against every parcel or against the entire
subdivision.53
Thus, the court decided that the use restriction on the larger
portion of Sublot 2 was still binding, but that the restriction on the
smaller portion of Sublot 2 had been extinguished by the Act.
The court then went on to consider the second issue of whether
the use restriction was nullified by the "substantial and drastic
changes in the neighborhood. 51 4 Affirming the lower court, the opinion
read:
After carefully reviewing the record . . . reasonable minds
can come to different conclusions whether there was a sub-
stantial change in the character of the neighborhood in the
vicinity of the property of plaintiffs and defendants so as
to nullify the deed restrictions limiting the use of the prop-
erty for residential uses only .... The trial court found there
was a substantial change in the character of the neighbor-
hood. Under such circumstances an appellate court must
affirm the judgment of the trial court.55
The end result of Semachko is the same as in the lower court.
The use restriction of Original Sublot 2 is nullified by the change in
the condition of the neighborhood. But the importance of Semachko
goes beyond the mere affirmance of the lower court's ruling. The real
importance of Semachko is found in the court's long-overdue will-
ingness to examine and to apply the basic precepts of the Ohio Mar-
ketable Title Act.
The Act Outside Semachko
Semachko outlined the main concepts of the Act and how they
function, but some provisions of the Act were not discussed because
they had no application to the facts in Semachko.
The first provision of the Act which was not discussed is an
exception to the statement that the record marketable title is subject
to ". . . all interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments
3 Id.
1d. at 209, 301 N.E.2d at 563.
"Id. at 216, 301 N.E.2d at 566.
1974]
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of which such chain of record title is formed .... "56 Besides the ex-
ception of the specific mention, as opposed to general reference, in one
of the muniments to a restriction in a deed prior to the root of title,
referred to in Semachko, this unmentioned exception involves the
case of a possibility of reverter, right of entry or power of termina-
tion for breach of a condition subsequent.57 Seemingly, the legisla-
ture found these restrictions more undesirable than any of the others
and therefore departed from the Model Act 8 by making even a
specific mention in the root, of one of these restrictions found in a
deed prior to the root, ineffective to keep them alive.59 The Ohio Act
also allows their extinguishment if they are named in the muni-
ments but have existed for more than forty years following the effec-
tive date of the root of title.6 The only method of keeping either of
these restrictions alive is found in §5301.51, which enables the claim-
ant to file, within the forty year period following the effective date
of the root of title, a written notice, duly verified by oath, setting
forth the nature of the claim. 61 For example, if the fact pattern were:
A - owner in fee simple absolute
to B - January 1, 1913 deed with possibility of reverter
to C - January 1, 1927 deed with specific mention of the
possibility of reverter
to D - January 1, 1973 deed with no mention of the possi-
bility of reverter, but general state-
ment that the title is subject "to all
restrictions of record",
and marketability is being determined as of February 1, 1973, title
would be deemed one in fee simple absolute. The restriction on the
deed conveyed in 1927, despite its specific mention, is extinguished
by the Act, unless during the forty-year period following the effec-
tive date of the root of title (which is the deed in the 1927 transfer)
a claimant has filed the necessary notice in the Notice Index to pre-
serve the possibility of reverter. Since this has not been done, the
possibility of reverter is no longer part of the holder's title.
Even if a claimant has recorded his notice in the Notice Index,
this recording must be done again and again within forty years each
time a later transfer of the land becomes a new root of title.62 The
56 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.49(A) (Page 1970), set out suPra note 7.
57Id.
18 Id.
59 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.49(A) (Page 1970).
60 Id.
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.51 (A) (Page 1970).
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Act requires the filing of the interest for the preservation of a pos-
sibility of reverter, a right of entry or power of termination for
breach of condition subsequent, within the forty-year period follow-
ing the effective date of the root of title.63 Therefore, when the root
of title changes there must be found a record in the Notice Index of
this interest within the forty year period after the new root of title,
or the interest will be extinguished."
In our hypothetical, C's deed to D becomes the new root of title
on January 1, 2013, and even if a claimant had recorded the pos-
sibility of reverter prior to January 1, 1967, which would have
preserved it on C's title, the claimant would have to record it again
prior to January 1, 2013 in order to preserve it still further. If the
claimant fails to file his recording during the forty year period prior
to January 1, 2013, the effect is to extinguish the possibility of re-
verter just as if it had never been recorded in the Notice Index prior
to 1967.
As Professor Basye points out:
The prime objective of the Marketable Title Acts in limit-
ing the period of record search and examination is accom-
plished by this very simple but most important provision
affecting the recording acts in requiring periodic rerecord-
ing on nonpossessory interests. The boon to the cause of
marketability is immeasureable, while the additional burden
to the owners of obscure interests is negligible.6 5
The probable result of this re-recording process will be that those
interests which are no more than ones created by errors in convey-
ancing, or genuine ones which are no longer useful to the owner, will
be extinguished by the Act because there will be no recording or re-
recording.66 Valid claims will be filed in the Notice Index and the
title examiner will find these claims in his search of the period fol-
lowing the root of title. Consequently, the search time is reduced
appreciably and outmoded interests are extinguished, while valid
interests will be protected. 67
Another application of the Act which should be mentioned is the
effect of the forty-year period specified in the Act in determining
marketability when applied to "Wild Deeds."
63 Smith, supra note 24, at 719.
6Id.
6
s BASYE, supra note 8, at 369.
66 1d. at 367.
67 Id.
6 3 R. HAUSSER & W. VAN AKEN, OHIO PRACTICE 143-44 (1964).
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Since the purpose of the marketable title statutes is to
eliminate the need for searching back to the sovereign, such
statutes are not concerned with the quality of the title con-
veyed by the root. So long as the instrument serving as the
root of title purports to convey an interest, it is effective
to extinguish prior claims and interests. Thus, it is possible
even for the grantee of a complete stranger to divest the
title of a record owner.69
Thus, a fraudulent conveyance can become the root of title under
the Act and divest the real owner of his interest.70 The following
pattern will achieve this result:
BLACKACRE
WILD DEED ACTUAL DEED
X (stranger to deed) A owner in fee simple of
Blackacre
Y (1932) B 1900-in fee simple
Z (1973) C 1931
D 1973
If marketability is being determined as of 1973, X, who had no
interest in the land in question, by his fraudulent conveyance to Y,
has effectively divested D of his interest in the land. The "Wild Deed"
is now the legal title because the Act allows the 1932 transfer to
become the root of title and marketability is determined from that
point hence. From an equitable viewpoint this is a drawback of the
Act, but a strict statutory constructionist would retort that this
result helps fulfill the Act's espoused purpose - simplifying and
facilitating land title transfers.
There are also some interests which the Act specifically ex-
cludes from its operation. The Act provides that:
The provisions of sections 5301.47 to 5301.56, inclu-
sive, of the Revised Code, shall not be applied:
(A) To bar any lessor or his successor as reversioner
of his right to possession on the expiration of any lease or
any lessee or his successor of his rights in and to any lease;
69 Barnett, supra note 62, at 57.
70 Marshall v. Hollywood, 224 So.2d 743 (Fla., 1969). Defendant's deed was fraudulently ob-
tained by defendant's predecessors in title. Defendant knew that his title was fraudulent, but
contended that under the Florida Marketable Title Act this was not an issue. The court
agreed at 749:
... [S]ince the purpose of the act is to allow persons to rely on the record title
to real property, it would be inconsistent to construe the words "vested ...of
record" in that sentence in such a way as to require an inquiry behind the record.
Contra, Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Lawndale, 41 II.2d 316, 243 N.E.2d 193 (1968).
[Vol.23:337
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(B) To bar or extinguish any easement or interest in
the nature of an easement created or held for any railroad
or public utility purpose;
(C) To bar or extinguish any easement or interest in
the nature of an easement, the existence of which is clearly
observable by physical evidence of its use;
(D) To bar or extinguish any easement or interest in
the nature of an easement, or any rights granted, excepted,
or reserved by the instrument creating such easement or
interest, including any rights for future use, if the existence
of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location
beneath, upon, or above any part of the land described in
such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire cable, conduit,
duct, sewer, track, pole, tower, or other physical facility and
whether or not the existence of such facility is observable;
(E) To bar or extinguish any mortgage recorded in
conformity with section 1701.66 of the Revised Code;
(F) To bar or extinguish any right, title, or interest of
the United States, or of the state of Ohio, of any political
subdivision body politic, or agency thereof. 71
Therefore, the Act may not be applied against:
1. a lessor or lessee, or their successors, to bar them from any
rights they may have under any lease;
2. any easement held by or for
a. a railroad,
b. a public utility, or
c. any other easement holder, if the use of the easement is
observable;
3. any easement, or the rights therefrom, if the existence of the
easement is evidenced by the location beneath, upon, or above any
part of the land described in the instrument granting the easement
by any physical facility, regardless of whether or not the physical
facility is readily observable;
4. any mortgage recorded in conformity with Ohio law for the
recording of public utility mortgages ;72 and
7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.53 (Page 1970), as amended (Page, Current Material
1974).
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1701.66 (Page 1970).
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5. any interest in land of any political subdivision of Ohio, or
the State of Ohio itself, or the United States. 3
It is evident from a cursory glance at these exceptions that the
title examiner's work is greatly hampered by these exclusions from
the Act. Since there is no time limit in the exceptions, the title ex-
aminer must always search for them far past the period specified in
the Act for determining marketability. In addition, some type of
physical observation of the property by the searcher would appear
to be a necessity. But even with these exceptions, which have not
gone without criticism, 74 the Ohio Marketable Title Act can do much
to further the free and unencumbered transfer of land in Ohio.7 5
Last, in Semachko the question of the constitutionality of the
Act was not raised,6 although the court did say that these acts had
been upheld in other states when their constitutionality had been
raised. 7 The two primary reasons the other acts have been upheld
are also found in the Ohio Act. The first is the recording of a notice
of claim, 78 discussed in Semachko. The second is the grace period
which, in the Ohio Act, extended the forty-year period of effective-
ness of the Act in extinguishing interests in land for a period of
three years after the effective date of the Act.79 In the event the con-
stitutionality of the Act is ever questioned, it seems most probable
that it would be upheld because of these inclusions. 0
Conclusion
The need for legislation which would reduce the amount of time
needed to search land titles for defects has long been recognized. In
1961 Ohio joined those states having such legislation by the passage
of the Ohio Marketable Title Act, which was patterned directly after
the Model Act prepared by Simes and Taylor for the American Bar
Association.
The Ohio Act was discussed for the first time in Semachko v.
Hopko, decided in 1973, and the court discussed the general prin-
7 See Barnett, supra note 62, at 77, for a discussion of the sovereign exemption.
7 4 Smith, supra note 24, at 715-16.
75 Id. at 720.
76 35 Ohio App.2d 205, 212, 301 NXE.2d 560, 564 (8th Dist. 1973).
77 id., citing Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957); Tesdell v. Hanes,
248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957).
78 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.51-.52 (Page 1970). For discussion of this portion of the
Act and its effect on constitutionality see Barnett, supra note 62, at 52-53.
79 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5301.56 (Page 1970), as amended (Page, Current Material
1974). See also Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957).
80 For discussion of the constitutionality of Marketable Tide Acts generally see Note, Consti-
tutionality of Marketable Title Legislation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 413 (1962); BASYH, supra
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ciples of the Act and how they should be applied. The term "root
of title" was defined and explained, and the court described how it,
and the other muniments of the title to the land in question, deter-
mine the marketability of that title.
Other provisions of the Act applicable in Semachko were ex-
plained and expounded upon, such as the definition of "marketable
record title," and who may invoke the Act to claim such "marketable
record title." In addition, the court outlined what restrictions the
"record marketable title" in Semachko was and was not subject to.
Finally, the court gave an explanation of what is necesary in order
to maintain or extinguish an interest in land if the interest was in
existence prior to the effective date of the root of title.
Then, turning away from the Act, the court in Semachko briefly
discussed the effect of substantial changes in the character of a neigh-
borhood, on restrictions in a deed.
The importance of Semachko is not in any way diminished by
the court's failure to include a discussion of the provisions of the
Act which had no bearing on the problem which Semachko presented.
Discussion of the Act by an Ohio court was long overdue and much
needed. Semachko supplied that need. It spelled out the basic prin-
ciples of the Act for other courts to follow, and gave the title ex-
aminer, whether an attorney or an employee of a title company, the
much-needed guidelines to follow in applying the Act to achieve its
avowed purpose: the shortening of the time needed to perform a land
title search. Semachko gave the Ohio Marketable Title Act what it
sorely needed for twelve years - its chance before the tribunal.
James F. Szallert
t Law Review Candidate; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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